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Abstract
We study social learning about a new product in a model with subjective communication (inﬂu-
enced by agents’ beliefs) and self-selection of social contacts. Self-selection implies that consumers
will be disappointed on average. Subjective communication implies that the messages sent will tend
to be negative. In this model, unless the quality advantage of the new product is large enough,
learning causes the set of consumers choosing the new product to shrink over time. Thus, learning
may help eﬃciency by driving out inferior new products, but can hurt eﬃciency by reducing the
consumption of new products that are superior. We show that learning in more ”diverse” neigh-
borhoods implies more consumption of the new product. However, these neighborhoods are more
receptive to new products regardless of their quality. A number of extensions are studied, including
more accurate communication, communication with subjective thresholds, and less accurate con-
sumption experience. The results provide a learning-based explanation of why some communities
seem resistant to new products or ideas.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We learn from the experience of others every day. We ask our friends about which movie to see and
our colleagues about which seminar to attend; we observe strangers buying certain products rather
than others, and we get exposed to publicly provided information. Various features of such social
forms of learning have been studied by an extensive literature.1 Two features that are perhaps among
the most fundamental characteristics of social learning but that have not been studied are subjective
communication and self-selection among one’s social contacts.
Subjective communication. Explicit communication between agents is, in many settings, the most
natural way of exchanging payoﬀ-relevant information. Yet, part of the literature disregards commu-
nication altogether, and only considers learning from observing others’ actions.2 Some of the studies
that do consider communication deﬁne it as the (possibly imperfect) observation of payoﬀs.3 Our
view is that what distinguishes communication from direct observation is not their subject (payoﬀs
or actions could both be observed directly or learned from word-of-mouth4) or their precision (direct
observation and communication can both be imprecise). Rather, an important diﬀerence between the
two is that communication is inherently subjective, in the sense of being inﬂuenced by individuals’
beliefs and expectations. For example, a disappointed customer is unlikely to recommend a product,
even if the disappointment was due to her excessively high expectations.5 Our model of social learning
will incorporate this feature of communication.
Self-selection. When we want to learn from others’ experience, we usually ask someone who has
the relevant experience (or who we think might have it). Thus, when we want to know if a seminar
is worth going to, we might ask someone who has already heard the speaker, has read the paper,
or knows the catering company the organizers order from. But having or not having a particular
experience is often the consequence of the choices one makes. For example, our colleague might have
chosen to read the paper because he thought it would be good, because it was related to his work,
or because the speaker is his friend. Thus, the set of agents with relevant experience that one might
consult tends to be a self-selected sample from the population.6
1See Chamley (2004) for a detailed survey.
2One reason that is sometimes given in favor of studying the observation of actions rather than ”words” is that the
latter is non-credible (cheap talk). While this can be true between competing producers or between a politician and the
public, in many situations the parties lack strategic incentives, and the information they provide is credible. Friends,
relatives, or even complete strangers usually have little incentive to misrepresent the information one might ask them to
provide in every-day life.
3Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) assume observable payoﬀs. Fudenberg and Banerjee (2004) allow for direct
observation of actions and a signal correlated with payoﬀs.
4In some situations, payoﬀs are observable without explicit communication (e.g., oil drillers may be able to see if
oil was found on a neighboring track, and might have a pretty good idea about the associated payoﬀs, as in Hendricks
and Kovenock (1989)). In other situations, actions are not observable unless communication occurs (e.g., if the relevant
action was taken in the past).
5Januszewski (2004) provides evidence that in the airline industry ”customer complaints are largely driven by disap-
pointed consumers who received worse service than they expected” (23). The importance of having more realistic models
of communication in social learning was also emphasized by Shiller (1995).
6When agents do not have access to complete histories (or their summary statistics), the literature usually assumes
that contacts are a representative sample from the population. Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) consider a biased rule
which oversamples rare choices - this is essentially the opposite of the self-selection logic. Manski (2004) studies the
selection problem that arises when only a subset of possible actions are chosen by the population.
2As we show in this paper, the interaction of subjective communication and self-selection has im-
portant consequences for social learning, and can yield some surprising results. In particular, our
model provides a learning-based explanation of why certain communities seem reluctant to embrace
new products, technologies, or ideas.7
We study a common-value setting in which agents face a choice between an ”Old” product with
known quality and a ”New” one whose quality they do not know. Agents base their decision on their
opinions, which are private information, but which are, at least initially, an unbiased estimator of the
true quality of the new product. In such a setting agents who decide to consume the new product
overestimate its quality on average. Thus, they experience a negative ”post-decision surprise” (Har-
rison and March, 1984).8 In the second round, a new set of agents has a chance to learn from this
self-selected group of experienced agents before making their own consumption choices. Learning is
Bayesian. We assume that communication is subjective in that it is inﬂuenced by the ”surprise” of
the experienced agents (the diﬀerence between their initial opinion and the consumption experience).
Because surprise is on average negative, negative messages will be overrepresented in the communi-
cation. We study the resulting evolution of opinions and consumption choices in a benchmark model
and several extensions.
In the benchmark model of Section 2, we make three strong assumptions. We assume that con-
sumption completely reveals the product’s quality, but that communication is limited to the sign of
an experienced agent’s surprise. Most importantly, we assume that an agent and his contacts share
identical initial opinions. In this setting, social learning gradually eliminates the surprise in the pop-
ulation, so that on average consumers will eventually form correct opinions about the new product’s
quality. The main result of this section is that unless the new product is far superior to the old one,
the negative messages generated in social learning will unambiguously reduce the measure of agents
choosing the new product. Thus, social learning helps eﬃciency for new products that are inferior
to the old one, as it speeds up their rejection by the population. When the new product is highly
inferior to the old one, even limited subjective communication can transmit enough information to
drive it out of the market immediately. However, learning also reduces the consumption of superior
new products, and thus hurts eﬃciency in that case. If the new product has only a small quality
advantage, its consumption might cease completely.
In Section 3, the benchmark model is compared to a setting where agents have contacts within a
“neighborhood” i.e. with agents who have similar but not necessarily identical initial opinions to their
own. In this model, when a receiver gets a message, she will not know the sender’s initial opinion
exactly, but she will know that the sender is in the neighborhood. Naturally, since messages are less
informative in this setting, we ﬁnd that opinions are slower to adjust towards the truth. As we show,
7In many social sciences, explanations of such resistance to novelty are centered on cultural constraints (see, e.g.
Adongo et al. (1997) for ”cultural factors constraining the introduction of family planning” in Ghana). Munshi and
Myaux (2002) provide an economic explanation along these lines.
8This result is related to the Winner’s curse and similar phenomena. See Van den Steen (2004) for a discussion.
Israel (2004) ﬁnds empirical evidence from the automobile insurance industry that ”consumers who choose to join the
ﬁrm tend to be excessively optimistic about its quality and thus disappointed by actual experiences”, which, he notes, is
”consistent with the idea that, while the average consumer has an accurate prior about the ﬁrm’s quality, those consumers
w h oc h o o s et oj o i naﬁrm are the most optimistic about its quality” (p4).
3this result has the striking implication that in larger neighborhoods, the measure of consumers of
the new product is also larger, regardless of whether the new product is better or worse than the
old one. Thus, more ”diverse” communities seem more receptive to the New, be it good or bad.
The intuition for this result comes from four ways in which learning from neighbors is diﬀerent from
learning from oneself (or from someone similar to oneself). The experienced-neighbor eﬀect occurs
when people learn from others who have tried a product which they themselves would not have tried.
The misleading-neighbor eﬀect means that a neighbor might send the opposite message than what the
individual would have sent to herself. The inexperienced-neighbor eﬀect operates when someone does
not learn the bad news about an inferior new product because her neighbor did not try it. Finally,
the learning-from-neighbors eﬀect results from the fact that the disappointing messages are discounted
when coming from people who are diﬀerent from oneself. As we show, these four eﬀects together imply
that more diverse neighborhoods are more favorable to the diﬀusion of both inferior and superior new
products.9
Sections 4, 5, and 6 provide some robustness checks on the model. In Section 4, we allow for more
precise communication, and show that while the eﬀects are smaller, the basic ﬁndings generalize. In
Section 5, we relax the assumption that consumption fully reveals the quality of the product. We
show that an imprecise signal of quality still results in messages that are negative in expectation,
but the bias becomes less severe as we increase the variance of the signal. In the ﬁnal extension of
Section 6, we consider a slightly diﬀerent communication technology. Speciﬁcally, we allow agents to
communicate their actual experience, so that initial expectations do not inﬂuence the content of the
messages, but we assume that messages will be sent only if there was a suﬃciently large surprise.
Thus we have selection eﬀects both in participation and communication. We show that our ﬁnding of
disproportionately negative messages survives in this environment as well.
2 The benchmark model
2.1 Self-selection and disappointment
In this section we describe a benchmark model of social learning by consumers who have chosen
to consume a new product. There is a continuum of agents, uniformly distributed over the unit
interval. Every agent can choose between an ”old” product with ﬁxed and known quality c and a
“new” product with some ﬁxed but unknown quality θ.10 We deﬁne the surplus that the new product
represents relative to the old one as δ ≡ θ − c, which is unknown to the agents. Ideally, agents would
like to choose the new product if and only if δ>0.
B e f o r em a k i n gac h o i c e ,a g e n ti observes a private signal x0i of the quality θ, where x0i = θ + ε0i
and ε0i ∼ U
¡
−1
2, 1
2
¢
. We will refer to agents with x0i >θand x0i <θas “optimists” and “pessimists”,
respectively. After observing the private signal x0i, the agent’s belief about θ is uniform on [x0i −
9See Bala and Goyal (1998) for diﬀerent implications of learning from neighborhoods.
10A more consistent formulation would assume that agents have improper priors on θ, as in the global games literature
(see Morris and Shin (2002) for an overview). The distinction will not matter here.
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Figure 1: The benchmark model
1
2,x 0i + 1
2], with mean x0i. In what follows, we will need to distinguish between expectations formed
by an agent who does not know θ, and those formed by an outside observer who knows θ. Because
the agent has less information, we will call expectations conditional on his information set ”opinions”,
denoted oi. Thus, we write oi (θ|x0i)=x0i, and the agent will choose the new product as long as
x0i >c .Figure 1 illustrates.
If the agent decides to consume the new product, she receives a second signal, x1i. In this section,
we make the assumption that experience fully reveals the quality of the product.
Assumption 1 (Experience is fully revealing) x1i = θ.
Under Assumption 1, after consumption, the agent updates her opinion to oi (θ|x0i,x 1i)=θ.11 We
deﬁne the “surprise” of an agent i as the diﬀerence between her opinion after and before consumption:
si ≡ oi(θ|x0i,x 1i) − oi(θ|x0i)=θ − x0i. (1)
Deﬁnition (1) is consistent with the notion that (Bayesian) agents should not expect to be surprised,
in other words, their opinion about their surprise is 0. Indeed, from (1), we get oi(si|x0i)=oi(θ|x0i)−
x0i =0 . However, whether (from the outside observer’s point of view) expected surprise equals 0 is a
diﬀerent question. If δ ≥ 1
2, then it is true that E(si|x0i >c ,θ )=θ − E(x0i|x0i >c ,θ )=0 . However,
if δ ∈
¡
−1
2, 1
2
¢
, then E(x0i|x0i >c ,θ ) is easily computed to be 1
2(c+θ + 1
2). This expression is greater
than θ, implying that the expected surprise of an agent will be negative:
E (si|x0i >c ,θ )=θ − E(x0i|x0i >c ,θ )=
1
2
(δ −
1
2
) < 0. (2)
If only those with suﬃciently high initial opinions consume a good, on average consumers will be
disappointed. This is simply because those with the lowest initial opinions, who could have a positive
experience, choose not to consume. Note that a higher surplus δ means that more agents will consume,
implying less self-selection. Average disappointment decreases with δ, and becomes 0 when δ = 1
2.
Thus, the surplus δ determines the magnitude of the selection eﬀect. We will be interested in the
empirically relevant case when δ ∈
¡
−1
2, 1
2
¢
, so that some agents choose the new product, while others
pick the old one.
11The agent’s initial opinion oi(θ|x0i) is x0i, even if she takes into account the additional signal she might get if she
consumes the good, as E[E(θ|x0i,x 1i)|x0i]=x0i by the law of iterated expectations.
5The rest of the paper examines the consequences of the simple observation captured in (2) for
social learning.
2.2 Communication and learning in the second round
Now let us assume that there is a second group of agents, J, without any information. Each of them
knows some agents from the ﬁrst group, I,and can talk to them. Thus, before making his consumption
decision, agent j observes messages mij, which may provide information on θ, as well as her initial
opinion x0j.
As discussed in the Introduction, this paper extends previous literature on social learning by
assuming that the messages mij are subjective in the sense of being inﬂuenced by initial expectations
or opinions, as well as the consumption experience itself. The notion that communication is inﬂuenced
by initial expectations (disappointment and positive surprises) is both intuitive and supported by a
large body of literature. First, disappointing consumption experiences clearly occur across a wide
variety of products and settings. Israel (2004) shows that customers switch automobile insurance
companies as their expectations become disappointed at their original insurer. Miguel and Kremer
(2004) show that disappointing experiences with deworming drugs in Kenya reduced take-up in the
population. Second, that consumers’ reported satisfaction level with a product is a function of both the
actual experience and prior expectations, is a well-documented fact in consumer psychology. See Oliver
(1980) for a classic study and survey of the early literature on the ”disconﬁrmation paradigm”.12 In a
recent meta-analysis, Szymanski and Henard (2004) conclude that disconﬁrmation of expectations is
one of the strongest determinants of consumer satisfaction. In the economics literature, a recent paper
by Januszewski (2004) provides evidence that formal customer complaints in the airline industry are
explained by the diﬀerence between expected and actual quality, rather than actual quality per se.13
Third, more generally, a number of studies in the anthropology literature show that communication
about new products or technologies is subjective and limited, especially when the adopting community
lacks the language to talk about speciﬁc attributes. On the diﬀusion of modern contraceptive practices
in Northern Ghana, Adongo et al. (1997) write: ”The popular term for family planning is adog-
maake; a literal translation of this means ”to have enough births,” a notion that most men and
women greet with antipathy or fear. Few women have a sophisticated understanding of what this
term actually means, how methods work, or what contraceptives look like, apart form a vague belief
that contraception is a powerful medicine that prevents birth.” (p 1799).14
12Oliver (1980) considered a federal ﬂu vaccination program, and found that consumers’ reported satisfaction levels as
well as their expressed intention to re-purchase the vaccine was a function of ”disconﬁrmed expectations”.
13The notion that satisfaction is aﬀected by prior expectations is directly related to the theory of reference points, as
in Kahnemann and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. See Kõszegi and Rabin (2004) for an economic model in which
prior expectations form the reference point.
14Adongo et al. (1997) go on to write ”The Kassem translation of the term family planning is lorilao meaning
”to have a good birth.” Although this term does not have the connotation of danger that is associated with adog-
maake, it nevertheless emphasizes the birth process rather than the positive aspects of child spacing. Child spacing is
a tradition that is respected, while contraception remains a subject that is emberrassing to divulge...”. See also Kohler
(1997) who cites several studies from the demography and anthropology literature showing that in developing countries,
communication about contraceptives is limited and does not include several relevant details of women’s experience with
a given method. Bernardi (2003) discusses similar evidence from a developed country.
6In this section, we model the notion of subjective communication in a simple manner, extensions
are discussed in Sections 4 and 6. We assume that an experienced agent i can communicate one of
three messages to an agent j from the second group. She either says that she had a good surprise
(mij =1if si > 0), or that she had a bad surprise (mij = −1 if si < 0), or she says nothing (mij =0
if x0i <c ).15
Assumption 2 (Limited subjective communication)
mij =

 
 
1 if si > 0
−1 if si < 0
0 otherwise

 
 
In this model with limited subjective communication, the result in (2) implies that, on average,
t h e r ew i l lb em o r en e g a t i v et h a np o s i t i v em e s s a g e s sent. In particular, the probability that an ex-
perienced agent i asked at random would indicate that the product was a disappointment is given
by
Pr(mij = −1) = Pr(si < 0|x0i >c ,θ )=P r( θ<x 0i|x0i >c ,θ )=
(
1
1+2δ if δ>0
1 if δ ≤ 0
)
(3)
The probability of receiving a positive message is the complementary probability 1 − Pr(mij = −1),
implying that for every experienced contact, the expected value of the message going to an agent in
the second group is negative:
E(mij)=
2δ − 1
2δ +1
< 0 (4)
if δ>0 (and E(mij)=−1 otherwise). The rest of the section deals with how these negative messages
might aﬀect consumers’ opinions and consumption decisions in subsequent rounds.
Since unless agents in the second round have some extra information about ﬁrst round agents’
beliefs, learning about a surprise is totally uninformative (as it is simply the diﬀerence between two
noise terms), we will have to specify what agents’ know about their contacts. In the benchmark model,
we assume that every agent has exactly one contact, with beliefs that are identical to his. Denoting
C(j) ⊆ I the set of contacts of an agent j ∈ J, we impose
Assumption 3 (Close contacts) I = J and C(i)={i}∀i.
This assumption captures in an extreme manner the notion that one’s social contacts tend to
be similar to oneself (such as friends or village neighbors). See Section 3 for further discussion and
extensions. Two cases in which this extreme assumption might be warranted are:
(i) Agents are persons facing the same consumption decision over and over again, they would
therefore like to recall the experience they previously had with the good. However, people’s ability
to recall past memories can have several limitations. When “memories” mii only take on values from
15Even this extreme formulation might not be that unrealistic. There is evidence in the psychology literature that lim-
ited messages or memories about the frequency with which a product has performed well guide consumer decisions. Alba
and Marmorstein (1987) provide experimental evidence that consumers use the number of positive/negative attributes
of a product as a decision heuristic, ignoring the magnitude or the relative importance of these attributes.
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Figure 2: Adjusting opinions between rounds 1 and 2
{−1,1}, the agent only remembers her previous opinion (x0i), and if she had a positive or negative
surprise when she ﬁrst consumed the good. This might be realistic if priors x0i are determined by the
environment (such as culture or family) and are therefore easier to recall than the signals x1i related
to infrequent consumption experiences.16
(ii) In the spirit of Manski (2004), an agent might represent a dynasty, deﬁn e db yap r i o rx0i which
“runs in the family”. This interpretation assumes that children learn their parent’s surprise, but not
their actual experience.
We now analyze the formation of opinions and the resulting consumption patterns under Assump-
tions 1-3. Upon receiving a message mii, a Bayesian agent who knows x0i will believe that θ is
uniformly distributed over the interval [x0i− 1
2,x 0i] if mii = −1,o rt h ei n t e r v a l[x0i,x 0i+ 1
2] if mii =1 .
When mii =0 , no new information is learned. Thus we can write the agent’s initial opinion in round
two as
o2
i(θ|x0i,m ii)=x0i + mii
1
4
(5)
where we use the superscript “2” to denote opinions formed in the second round. To simplify the
notation, we will use o2
i without arguments to denote the opinion of the agent about θ conditional
on whatever information (initial belief and messages) she has. Figure 2 illustrates the adjustment in
opinions from round 1 to 2.
Note that while accurate conditional on the information of the agent, the opinions in (5) will
generally be incorrect in expectation (from the outside observer’s point of view). In particular,
for δ>0, there is no selection among the optimists, so (5) is accurate conditional on mii = −1:
E((o2
i|mii=−1)|x0i >c , θ )=E(x0i|x0i >θ , θ ) − 1
4 = θ (see the dotted arrows in Figure 2), but for
pessimists, E((o2
i|mii=1)|x0i >c ,θ )=E(x0i|θ>x 0i >c ,θ )+1
4 = θ − 1
2
¡
δ − 1
2
¢
>θ .For δ<0, no
pessimist consumed the new product in the ﬁrst round, but there is selection among optimists, so that
E((o2
i|mii=−1)|x0i >c ,θ )=E(x0i|x0i >c ,θ )+1
4 = θ − 1
2
¡
δ − 1
2
¢
>θ .
In the second round, an agent will choose the new product iﬀ o2
i >c .We are interested in how
consumption choices and opinions change relative to the ﬁrst round as a result of the messages trans-
mitted. It is best to discuss separately the case of a superior (δ>0) and that of an inferior (δ<0)
16See Lynch et al. (1988) for studies in the psychology literature which ﬁnd that people remember (and use in their
decisions) overall evaluations, rather than information about the speciﬁc attributes of a consumption experience.
8new product.
The new product is superior. When the surplus from the new product is relatively large, so that
δ ≥ 1
4, (5) implies that we have o2
i|mii6=0 >c ,and all those who consumed the new product in the ﬁrst
round will do so in the second round as well (this is the case shown in Figure 2). In this case, learning
only aﬀects the opinions of a ﬁxed set of consumers.
How do these opinions compare to those in the ﬁrst round? When δ ≥ 1
4, expected surprise after
second round consumption, E(s2
i|o2
i >c ,θ ), can be computed as follows:
θ − [E((o2
i|mii=1)|x0i >c , θ )Pr(mii =1 |x0i >c ,θ )+E((o2
i|mii=−1)|x0i >c ,θ )Pr(mii = −1|x0i >c ,θ )]
=
µ
δ
2
−
1
4
¶
Pr(mii =1 |x0i >c ,θ )=
δ
2
2δ − 1
2δ +1
(6)
where we used the probabilities derived in (3). This expression is negative: on average there is still
disappointment in the population. However, it is smaller in absolute value than (2) expected surprise
in the ﬁrst round. The information learned from the ﬁrst round helped reduce the average distortion
in opinions in the second round.
When δ is smaller than 1
4, some consumers will consume the new product in the ﬁrst round but
not in the second. Note in particular that if a pessimistic agent consumed the new product in the
ﬁrst round, she will always consume it in the second round (since her opinion increases according to
(5)). However, some of the optimistic agents will consume the new product in the ﬁrst round but not
in the second: those with x0i between θ and c+ 1
4 will form opinions o2
i <ca n dw i l ls w i t c ht ot h eo l d
product.17 The measure of agents consuming in round two is given by
Pr(o2
i >c )=δ +
1
2
− (c +
1
4
− θ)=2 δ +
1
4
, (7)
which is smaller than the measure of agents consuming in the ﬁrst round, δ + 1
2. For new products
that are ”slightly” superior (0 <δ<1
4), the negative messages arriving from experienced agents lead
to a decrease in agents’ willingness to consume in the second round.
To calculate the expected surprise of those who do consume, use18
Pr(mii =1 |o2
i >c )=
δ
2δ + 1
4
Pr(mii = −1|o2
i >c )=
δ + 1
4
2δ + 1
4
17Note that agents with x0i above c+
1
4 will again take the new product, implying that, in contrast to the ﬁrst round,
second round willingness to consume the new product is monotonic in the initial belief x0i.
18To derive these expressions, note that x0i|(o
2
i >c , m ii =1 ,θ) ∼ U[θ − δ,θ] and x0i|(o
2
i >c , m ii = −1,θ) ∼
U[θ − δ +
1
4,θ+
1
2].
9to get
E(s2
i|o2
i >c )=θ − [E((o2
i|mii=1)|o2
i >c )Pr(mii =1 |o2
i >c )+E((o2
i|mii=−1)|o2
i >c )Pr(mii = −1|o2
i >c )]
=
µ
δ
2
−
1
4
¶
δ
2δ + 1
4
+
µ
δ
2
−
1
8
¶
δ + 1
4
2δ + 1
4
=
1
2
Ã
δ −
1
4
3δ + 1
4
2δ + 1
4
!
.
Again, one can check that E(s2
i|o2
i >c ) < 0 so that there is disappointment on average, but it is
s m a l l e rt h a ni nt h eﬁrst round.
The new product is inferior. When the surplus is negative (the new product is worse than the
old one), so that δ ≤ 0, the set of consumers shrinks, as only negative messages are transmitted. In
particular, when δ<−1
4, no one will consume the new product in the second round, as the highest
oi (= θ + 1
2) is reduced to o2
i = θ + 1
4 <c .When δ>−1
4, the measure of consumers is given by
Pr(o2
i >c )=δ + 1
4. In the latter case, opinions in the second round will be distributed uniformly
between c and θ + 1
4, implying that
E(s2
i|o2
i >c ,θ )=θ − E((o2
i|mii=−1)|o2
i >c ,θ )=θ −
µ
θ −
δ
2
+
1
8
¶
=
1
2
(δ −
1
4
).
Again, disappointment decreased compared to the ﬁrst round (see (2)).
The preceding discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) The disappointment among consumers of the new product decreases from round 1
to round 2: E(s1
i|o1
i >c ,θ ) <E (s2
i|o2
i >c ,θ ) < 0.
(ii) The measure of agents choosing the new product decreases: Pr(o1
i >c ) ≥ Pr(o2
i >c ).
The results summarized in Proposition 1 may be contrasted with the evolution of consumption
choices and opinions in the absence of communication. With no communication, the measure of
agents consuming the new product would be δ + 1
2 in round two, since exactly those with x0i >c
would consume it. This would keep expected disappointment and the measure of consumers constant
across periods. Unsurprisingly, Proposition 1(i) implies that, by providing information, social learning
reduces expected disappointment. More interestingly, Proposition 1(ii) implies that, by reducing the
measure of consumers of the new product, social communication helps eﬃciency when the new product
is inferior to the old one, but hurts eﬃciency when it is superior. This result captures the natural
consequence of learning from consumers who were disappointed on average. The negative messages
they send reduce the measure of consumers irrespective of the quality of the product.
Combining the eﬀects in parts (i) and (ii) suggests that if messages are sent over subsequent rounds,
the eﬃciency consequences of social learning might be mitigated. Because the result in (i) states that
disappointment decreases, we expect the negative eﬀect of social learning on the measure of consumers
to become smaller. This might help eﬃciency for a superior new product, but only if the negative
eﬀect is attenuated fast enough, before too many consumers stop consuming it. At the same time, this
attenuation might slow down the rejection of an inferior new product by the population of consumers.
We look at these issues in more detail below.
102.3 Many rounds
After the second round, each agent who consumed the good again sends a message, denoted m2
ii to a
contact facing a consumption decision in round 3 This message reveals if the agent was positively or
negatively surprised, leading the third round agent to form an opinion o3
i on θ. Consumption decisions
are made and messages are sent in this fashion in every subsequent round n. Thus, the message sent
in round n − 1 and received in round n is given by
mn−1
ii =

 
 
1 if sn−1
i > 0
−1 if sn−1
i < 0
0 if on−1
i <c

 
 
In round n>1, a Bayesian agent who knows (x0i,o n−1
i ,m n−1
ii ) forms the opinion on
i (θ|x0i,o n−1
i ,m n−1
ii )=
on−1
i + mn−1
ii
¡1
2
¢n , which generalizes the formula given in (5). Because of these recursive opinions,
knowing (x0i,o n−1
i ,m n−1
ii ) is equivalent to knowing (x0i,h n−1), where hn−1 ≡ (m1
ii,m 2
ii,...,m n−1
ii ) is
the complete history of messages. We may therefore write initial opinions in round n as
on
i (θ|x0i,h n−1)=x0i +
n−1 X
k=1
mk
ii
µ
1
2
¶k+1
. (8)
Clearly, mn−1
ii =0implies on−1
i = on
i for all n, so that once an agent consumes the old product, he
learns nothing about the new one, and will thus keep consuming the old product forever.
As before, we investigate the evolution of consumption patterns and opinions among those who
consume the new product. We have the following generalization of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 (i) For all n, E(sn
i |on
i >c ,θ ) ≤ E(sn+1
i |on+1
i >c ,θ ) ≤ 0.
(ii) Pr(on
i >c ) decreases monotonically in n up to round n0,w h e r en0 =m a x
©
n : |δ| <
¡1
2
¢nª
. If
δ>0, Pr(on
i >c )=
¡1
2
¢n0 + n0δ for all n ≥ n0, and if δ<0, Pr(on
i >c )=0for all n ≥ n0 +1 .
Proof. (i) Over time, learning causes opinions to converge towards θ, reducing average disap-
pointment.
(ii) It is best to consider three cases in turn: δ ≥ 1
4, 1
4 >θ>0, and 0 ≥ δ.
Case 1: δ ≥ 1
4.T h e nn0 =1 , and Pr(on
i >c )=δ + 1
2 for all n.
Case 2: 1
4 >δ>0. As we saw in the previous section, at the start of round 2, agents with x0i
between θ and c + 1
4 will form opinions o2
i <cand will not consume in this round. More generally,
opinions in (8) imply that at the start of round n>2, a measure of agents equal to
"
θ +
n X
k=3
µ
1
2
¶k−1#
−
"
c +
n X
k=2
µ
1
2
¶k#
=
µ
1
2
¶n
− δ
stop consuming. The set of consumers of the new product will keep shrinking until round n0 when
this becomes zero. The measure of agents consuming from round n0 onwards is 1 −
n0 P
k=1
h¡1
2
¢k − δ
i
=
¡1
2
¢n0 + n0δ.
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Figure 3: The evolution of Pr(on
i >c ). (From top to bottom, paths correspond to δ = 8
16, 7
16,...,− 7
16,
respectively.)
Case 3: δ ≤ 0. In this case, mn
ii = −1 for all n. From (8), the measure of agents consuming in
round n evolves according to
Pr(on
i >c )=
1
2
+ δ −
n X
k=2
µ
1
2
¶k
= δ +
µ
1
2
¶n
.
This expression declines monotonically in n, and reaches 0 at n0.
Proposition 2 generalizes the second round results of Proposition 1 in an intuitive manner. As
shown in the previous section, disappointment results in negative messages, which generally lead
to a decrease in the measure of consumers of the new product in the second round. However, the
messages sent convey useful information, and help reduce average disappointment in the population.
As Proposition 2 shows, if messages are sent over several periods, the reduction in disappointment
attenuates the negative eﬀect on consumption. As n increases, the measure of consumers of the new
product eventually stabilizes.
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the paths of Pr(on
i >c ) for diﬀerent values of
δ. The paths shown correspond to multiples of 1
16, with the highest path corresponding to δ = 8
16, the
next one to δ = 7
16 a n ds oo nd o w nt oδ = − 7
16. The paths corresponding to δ = 1
2, 1
4,0 and −1
4 are
marked with dotted lines. As Proposition 2(ii) shows, social learning does not aﬀect the measure of
consumers if the new product is highly superior to the old one (δ ≥ 1
4). However, if the new product
is only slightly better (1
4 >δ>0), the negative messages transmitted cause the measure of consumers
to decline over several rounds. If the surplus is small, this might continue for a long time, so that
only very few consumers end up choosing the new product. To see this formally, note that according
to Proposition 2(ii), lim
δ→0
£
Pr(on
i >c )=
¡1
2
¢n0 + n0δ
¤
≤ lim
δ→0
δ(1 + n0)=0 . Thus, the combination of
self-selection and limited communication studied here does not aﬀect eﬃciency when the new product
is highly superior to the old one, but hurts eﬃciency for new products that are only slightly superior.
Interestingly, in the 1
4 >δ>0 case, in any period n, the derivative of the measure of consumers
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Figure 4: Set of consumers (in bold) for n ≥ n0 =3 .
with respect to initial beliefs, ∂ Pr(on
i >c )/∂x0i, can be highly non-monotonic. As n increases,
disjunct sets of optimistic agents switch to the old product in each round. The outcome of the process
is illustrated in Figure 4 for the case of n0 =3 . The ﬁrst set of missing optimists, with x0i just above
θ, switch to the old product in round 2. The second set, with x0i just above θ + 1
4,s w i t c hi nr o u n d3 .
Finally, when the new product is worse than the old one, social learning clearly helps eﬃciency
by transmitting the negative messages. Eventually, the consumption of an inferior new product stops
completely, although the limited nature of communication means that this might take very long if the
quality diﬀerence is small: lim
δ→0
n0 →∞ . Learning does especially well when the new product is highly
inferior to the old one. As we already saw in the previous section, when δ<−1
4, consumption of the
new product ceases completely after the ﬁrst round.
To summarize, this model predicts that highly superior new products will be consumed by a large
set of consumers, whose disappointment will decrease over time. New products that are only slightly
superior, on the other hand, might end up being consumed by only a small fraction of the population.
At the same time, inferior new products will eventually be driven out of the market. In particular,
the limited communication studied here is suﬃcient to drive out inferior new products immediately
when the quality diﬀerence is large enough. Since without social learning, the set of consumers would
remain unchanged in this model, the combination of social learning and self selection helps eﬃciency
when the new product is inferior to the old one, but hurts eﬃciency when it is superior.
The analysis above has yielded some stark results, but relied on three strict assumptions: (i) that
the agent only learns from someone with identical prior to his; (ii) that the experience fully reveals
the new product’s quality; and (iii) that communication (or memory) is imperfect, and only surprises
are communicated. Below, we study the eﬀect of modifying each of these assumptions in turn.
3N e i g h b o r s
In this section we relax Assumption 3. We assume that agents in the second round can get messages
from their “neighbors”, who have similar (but not identical) priors to theirs. There is extensive
evidence from several literatures that the people one consults before making consumption decisions
about experience goods are socially close ”neighbors”. When choosing among contraceptive methods,
women rely on the advice of other women, who are their village neighbors, friends or parents (see,
e.g., Entwisle et al. (1996) on Thailand, and Bernardi (2004) on Italy). Munshi and Myaux (2002)
present evidence on the role of ethnic origin and religious aﬃliations in determining learning patterns
13about contraceptives in Bangladesh. Romani (2003) presents similar evidence on the diﬀusion of
agricultural innovations in Cote d’Ivoire. If people who are socially close share similar opinions, and
the agent knows this, then learning about the surprise of a neighbor is informative. We investigate
the implications of using such information below.
We assume that agents do not know the initial beliefs of their neighbors exactly. They only know
that it is close to theirs. In particular, let us assume that each agent j in the second round observes
messages from her “neighborhood” 0 <ω<1
2, i.e. C (j)={i|x0i ∈ [x0j − ω,x0j + ω]}.
As in the previous section, we start by computing the expected value of messages that are sent
after the ﬁrst round. If we randomly pick an agent from the second round who received a message
from her ω neighborhood, the probability that her message was negative is given by
Pr(mij = −1|θ,mij 6=0 )=P r( x0i >θ |θ,mij 6=0 )=
Pr(x0i >c ,x 0j − ω ≤ x0i ≤ x0j + ω,θ < x0i)
Pr(x0i >c ,x 0j − ω ≤ x0i ≤ x0j + ω)
.
We ﬁnd
Pr(mij = −1|θ,mij 6=0 )=P r( x0i >θ |θ,mij 6=0 )=
1 − ω
2
1 − ω
2 +2 δ
.
Hence, the expected value of the message received by the agent is given by
E (mij|mij 6=0 ,θ)=
(
−1 if δ ≤ 0
2δ−1+ ω
2
2δ+1−ω
2
if 1
2 − ω>δ>0
)
,
which is always negative. If the new product is worse than the old one, δ<0, all those who try it will
be disappointed, just as in the ω =0case, so each j agent who receives a message receives mij = −1
When the new product is better than the old one and we keep the neighborhood relatively small, the
larger the neighborhood, the higher the expected message. Although the expected message remains
negative, a larger neighborhood mitigates this distortion. The intuition is that a larger neighborhood
increases the range of potential j agents to whom a given i agent can send her message. However, the
neighborhood of a very optimistic i agent (who sends negative messages) increases relatively less, so
that on average fewer negative messages are sent. 19
Next, consider the opinion of an agent in the second round, given that there is a message. In the
Appendix, we prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 (i) If c + ω<x 0j, then
o2
j(θ|x0j,m ij)=x0j + mij
µ
1
4
−
1
8
ω
¶
.
19For example, the neighborhood of the most optimistic i agent, x0i = θ+
1
2, is only ω large, while less optimistic agents
have a neighborhood of size 2ω. Hence, as the neighborhood grows, the negative messages of the optimistic agents reach
relatively less people than the positive message of pessimistic agents. One might think that this eﬀect is the artifact of
the bounded support assumption on x0i and x0j given θ. However, all is needed is for the distribution of x0i and x0j to
be symmetric around θ. This is so because self-selection ensures that the most optimistic agents will tend to be further
away from θ than the most pessimistic agents. Consequently, a larger neighborhood will increase the range of potential
contacts of very optimistic i agents less than that of very pessimistic ones.
14(ii) If c<x 0j <c+ ω, then
o2
j(θ|x0j,1) =
ω
ω + x0j − c
µ
x0j +
1
4
ω +
1
4
¶
+
x0j − c
ω + x0j − c
µ
1
2
x0j +
1
2
c +
1
4
¶
o2
j (θ|x0j,0) =
1
4
(3x0j − ω + c)
o2
j(θ|x0j,−1) =
ω
ω + x0j − c
µ
x0j +
1
2
ω −
1
4
¶
+
x0j − c
ω + x0j − c
µ
3
4
x0j +
1
4
c −
1
4
¶
(iii) If c − ω<x 0j <c ,t h e n
o2
j(θ|x0j,1) =
1
4
(3x0 + ω + c +1 )
o2
j (θ|x0j,0) =
1
4
(3x0j − ω + c)
o2
j(θ|x0j,−1) =
1
2
(x0 + ω + c −
1
2
).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Part (i) of the Lemma generalizes the updating rule (5) of the benchmark case with ω =0 . We
see that when an agent has neighbors, she responds less to messages than when these messages come
from herself (the adjustment is mij
¡1
4 − 1
8ω
¢
compared to mij
1
4 in the benchmark case). The reason
is clear: whatever message (positive or negative) I get, I can never rule out the possibility that my
neighbor and I have initial opinions on the opposite side of θ. For example, a positive message might
still mean that x0i <θ<x 0j, i nw h i c hc a s eIw o u l dh a v es e n tm y s e l fan e g a t i v em e s s a g ei n s t e a d .T h u s
agents attenuate their adjustment, and this attenuation is larger the larger the neighborhood. When
ω = 1
2, agents do not respond to messages at all, and o2
j = x0j for all mij in part (i) of Lemma 1.
This diminished responsiveness to messages will be the basis of the ”learning-from-neighbors” eﬀect
we discuss below.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of the Lemma apply when an agent’s initial belief is in the neighborhood of the
cutoﬀ c. In this case, from part of her neighborhood, an agent can only get the message mij =0 , since
her neighbors with x0i <cwill not have consumed the new product. Thus, messages convey more
information, and the agent takes this into account when forming her opinions. Note in particular that
no news is bad news: mij =0implies that someone in the neighborhood had a signal x0i <c .This
c a u s e sa na g e n tr e c e i v i n ga0m e s s a g et oa d j u s th e ro p i n i o nd o w n w a r d s( n a t u r a l l y ,t h ea d j u s t m e n ti s
smaller than after mij = −1). This will be the basis of the ”inexperienced-neighbor”e ﬀect described
below.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss how the results of Section 2 with respect to consumption
patterns are modiﬁed if ω>0. To simplify the analysis, and to make the comparison with the
benchmark case more transparent, we assume that the neighborhood ω is small.20 Our main result is
the following.
20Speciﬁc a l l yw ea s s u m et h a t
1
6 ≥ ω to guarantee that we have o
2
j|mij=−1 <cin Lemma 1(ii), so that agents with x0j
just above c will stop consuming the new product if they get a negative message.
15Proposition 3 The measure of agents consuming in the second round, Pr(o2
j >c ), is increasing in ω
for all δ ∈ (−1
2, 1
2).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The proposition states that new products have a higher probability of being consumed if agents
learn from larger neighborhoods. This result is striking because it applies both when the new product
is better and when it is worse than the old one. We provide an intuitive explanation of the result
below. We phrase the discussion in terms of four ”eﬀects” that larger neighborhoods have on second
round consumption relative to the benchmark (or relative to smaller neighborhoods).
Consider ﬁrst the case of a superior new product (δ>0), and take an agent with x0j just below
the cutoﬀ c. This agent is quite pessimistic, so she would not receive a message or try the product
in the ω =0case. However, now she has neighbors who are less pessimistic than her, and therefore
try the product in the ﬁrst round. Precisely because the agent is quite pessimistic, her neighbors are
pessimistic also, and will therefore have a positive experience with the new product if they try it. If
our agent receives a message from such a neighbor, it will be a positive message, and will convince her
to try the product. We call this the ”experienced-neighbor”e ﬀect. Under this eﬀect, an agent who
would not get a message with ω =0might get a message of the ”right” sign. In eﬀect, she gets the
message she could not send to herself from someone else. This can only change consumption choices
from old to new, therefore the experienced-neighbor eﬀect always favors the new product.21
Second, take an agent with x0j just above the cutoﬀ c. Such an agent has neighbors who consumed
the old product, she therefore has a positive probability of getting a 0 message. From Lemma 1(ii),
we know that such a message is bad news, causing the agent to adjust her opinion downwards. Thus,
while the agent always consumed the new product when ω =0 , she might now choose the old one
instead. We call this the ”inexperienced-neighbor” eﬀect, which reduces the measure of consumers for
δ>0.
Third, take an agent with x0j just below θ: x0j ∈ [θ − ω,θ]. When c<θ− ω, such an agent
has a high enough x0j to try the product without a message. However, precisely because her x0j is
relatively high, she might have an optimistic neighbor, who will get disappointed by the new product.
If a pessimistic agent receives a negative message from such a neighbor, she will adjust her opinion
downwards. When δ is not too large, the agent will not try the product in the second round, even
though she would have tried it in the benchmark case of ω =0 . We call this the ”misleading-neighbor”
eﬀect, since in this case the message sent by the neighbor is the opposite of what the agent would
have sent to herself. We observe this same eﬀe c tf o rt h eo p t i m i s t i ca g e n t sw i t hx0j ∈ [θ,θ+ω].I nt h e
benchmark case, these agents would get a negative message for sure and would therefore not consume
in the second round for δ<1
4. However, with ω>0, these slightly optimistic agents may have a
pessimistic neighbor and might therefore get a positive message. The misleading-neighbor eﬀect will
21Note that the experienced-neighbor eﬀect implies that the measure of consumers might increase from round 1 to
round 2, as agents between c − ω and c consume with positive probability in round 2. We conjecture that if we allow
for learning to continue over several rounds, there is a positive probability that everyone will end up consuming the new
product.
16cause them to consume the new product in the second round. As we see, the misleading-neighbor
eﬀect can favor both the old and the new product.
Finally, consider the case of an inferior new product (δ<0). In this case, we have two positive
neighborhood eﬀects. First, agents slightly above the cutoﬀ c might have a neighbor who is below
the cutoﬀ, and therefore did not consume the product. These agents will not get a message, and
some of them will consume the new product, even though they would have stopped consuming it after
receiving a negative message in the benchmark case. This is the inexperienced-neighbor eﬀect, which
favors the inferior new product. With no information coming from a neighbor who did not try the
product, the agent is forced to try the product and ”see for herself”.22
To see the second neighborhood eﬀect, recall that as Lemma 1(i) shows, even the agents who get a
message with probability 1 adjust their opinions less than in the benchmark case (by 1
4 − ω
8 instead of
1
4). When δ<0, this implies that if δ is not too large in absolute value, some agents who would have
formed opinions o2
j|mij=−1 <cin the benchmark case will now still have o2
j|mij=−1 >c , and will thus
consume the new product in round 2. We call this the ”learning-from-neighbors”e ﬀect. Because my
neighbor is diﬀerent from me, I do not adjust my opinion as much in response to a message coming
from her as I would if the message was coming from me. This eﬀect always favors the new product.
To summarize, we can isolate two eﬀects of having neighbors that unambiguously favor the new
product (experienced-neighbor, and learning-from-neighbors), and two eﬀects that can favor the old or
the new product (misleading-neighbor and inexperienced-neighbor). As we show in Proposition 3, the
neighborhood eﬀects favoring the new product always dominate. Thus, having a larger neighborhood
always has a positive impact on the probability that the new product will be consumed in the second
round. This is true regardless of whether the new or the old product is better.
These results suggest that when a community is more open or diverse in the sense that people
exchange opinions with others who are diﬀerent from them, the diﬀusion of a good product is further
facilitated by social learning. This occurs because some people will learn from others who have tried
the product which they themselves would have been too pessimistic to try (the experienced-neighbor
eﬀect); and because some optimistic people who would have been disappointed will instead get a
positive message from their neighbor, and thus try the product (the misleading-neighbor eﬀect). At
the same time, such communities might be slow in driving out inferior products, because some people
will not learn about an inferior product when talking to someone who has not tried it, and will thus
have to try it themselves (the inexperienced-neighbor eﬀect); and because the disappointing messages
resulting from self-selection will be discounted when coming from people who are diﬀerent from the
agent, leading her to consume the inferior new product (the learning-from-neighbors eﬀect). Thus,
more diverse communities have a tendency to be more receptive to the New, be it better or worse than
the Old.
22The inexperienced-neighbor eﬀect implies that, in contrast to the benchmark case in section 2, a positive measure of
consumers consume the new product in round 2 even if it is highly inferior (δ<−
1
4).
174 The accuracy of communication
In this section, we assume that the message mii can provide a more accurate description of the
experience θ. We relax Assumption 2 to capture the fact that apart from communicating the sign of
the surprise, people are often able to tell each-other how large their surprise was.
To model this formally, we assume that the message mii creates 2l partitions of equal size on the
information set (conditional on x0i) of each agent, [x0i− 1
2,x 0i+ 1
2]. The exogenous parameter l reﬂects
the informativeness of communication. A message mii(l) reveals which partition θ belongs to. The
benchmark model corresponds to l =1or two partitions, where mii revealed whether θ was in the
”upper” partition [x0i,x 0i + 1
2], or in the ”lower” partition [x0i − 1
2,x 0i]. As l becomes larger, mii(l)
locates θ more accurately.
Clearly, the exact value of the label mii is irrelevant, as long as each value identiﬁes a partition
unambiguously. To simplify the algebra, we assume that mii(l) identiﬁes each partition with an odd
integer, with negative values corresponding to θ<x 0i, and higher absolute values corresponding to
larger distances from x0i. For example, if l =2 , besides communicating the sign of the surprise in the
ﬁrst round, agent i can also indicate whether his surprise was ”large and positive” (mii =3 ), ”small
and positive” (mii =1 ), ”small and negative” (mii = −1), or ”large and negative” (mii = −3). More
generally,
mii(l)=
(
−(2k − 1) if θ + k−1
2l <x 0i <θ+ k
2l
2k − 1 if θ − k
2l <x 0i <θ− k−1
2l
)
(9)
where k ∈ [1,l] is an integer such that 2k − 1 identiﬁes the partition. Under these messages, opinions
in the second round are given by
o2
i(θ|x0i,m ii(l)) = x0i + mii(l)
1
4l
, (10)
which generalizes formula (5) in the benchmark case. Figure 5 illustrates the updating rule (10) for
l =2 .
As before, an agent in the second round will choose the new product iﬀ o2
i >c .When comparing
this setup to the benchmark case, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 (i) The measure of second-round consumers, Pr(o2
i >c ), (weakly) increases in l when
δ>0 and decreases in l when δ<0.
(ii) Expected disappointment |E(s2
i|o2
i >c ,θ )| decreases in l.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case of δ>0. Since (10) implies that an agent’s opinion can fall below
θ by at most 1
4l, the set of consumers will remain unchanged after the ﬁrst round as long as δ ≥ 1
4l.
To compute expected surprise in this case, recall that in the benchmark case, opinions conditional on
a message were accurate, as long as the message was not the highest one actually sent (mii =1 ). The
same result holds in the more general case. If θ −
¯ k
2l <c<θ−
¯ k−1
2l for some ¯ k, opinions in (10) imply
that for all k<¯ k, a message mii(l)=2 k − 1 results in an opinion that is accurate conditional on the
message. Opinions are only distorted conditional on the highest message actually sent, mii(l)=2 ¯ k−1.
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Figure 5: Adjustment of opinions when l =2 .
In particular,
o2
i|mii=2¯ k−1 = x0i +( 2¯ k − 1)
1
4l
,
and
E((o2
i|mii=2¯ k−1)|x0i >c ,θ )=
θ −
¯ k−1
2l + c
2
+( 2¯ k − 1)
1
4l
= θ −
δ
2
+
¯ k
4l
>θ . (11)
Because message mii(l)=2 ¯ k − 1 is sent with probability Pr(mii(l)=2 ¯ k − 1|x0i >c ,θ )=
θ−
¯ k−1
2l −c
δ+1
2
,
expression (11) implies that the average surprise is given by
E(s2
i|x0i >c , θ )=E(θ − (o2
i|mii=2¯ k−1)|x0i >c ,θ )Pr(mii(l)=2 ¯ k − 1|x0i >c ,θ )
=
µ
δ
2
−
¯ k
4l
¶
δ −
¯ k−1
2l
δ + 1
2
=
³
δ −
¯ k
2l
´³
δ −
¯ k
2l + 1
2l
´
2δ +1
This expression generalizes the expected surprise (6) derived in the benchmark case. One can check
that it is negative and increasing in l.
When δ is between 0 and 1
4l, some consumers will consume the new product in the ﬁrst round
but not in the second. Optimistic agents with x0i between θ and c + 1
4l adjust downwards by 1
4l and
stop consuming. Agents between c + 1
4l and θ + 1
2l adjust downwards by the same amount, which is
enough to keep them consuming. However, agents between θ + 1
2l and c +31
4l adjust by −3 1
4l and
stop consuming. Those between c +31
4l and θ +21
2l again consume, and so on (see Figure 6 below
illustrating the case l =4 ). The measure of agents consuming in round two is given by
Pr(o2
i >c )=δ +
1
2
−
l X
k=1
·
c +( 2 k − 1)
1
4l
− θ − (k − 1)
1
2l
¸
= δ(1 + l)+
1
4
,
which generalizes expression (7), and is increasing in l.
***opinions: to be completed
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Figure 6: Set of second-round consumers (bold segments) when l =4 .
Finally, when the surplus is negative, only negative messages are transmitted, and the set of
consumers shrinks every period. When δ<− 1
4l, consumption stops completely after the ﬁrst round.
When δ>− 1
4l, so that some agents consume, o2
i ∼ U[c,θ + 1
4l], implying that
E(s2
i|o2
i >c ,θ )=θ − E(o2
i|o2
i >c ,θ )=
δ
2
−
1
8l
and
Pr(o2
i >c )=δ +
1
4l
.
These expressions also conﬁrm the proposition.
Since the more reﬁned communication technology allows for more precise information to be trans-
mitted regarding the unknown quality θ, it is not surprising that the eﬀects identiﬁed in the benchmark
case by Propositions 1 and 2 are weakened. As proposition 4 shows, expected disappointment declines,
and the measure of consumers changes in the direction required by eﬃciency. In particular, as com-
munication becomes more accurate, a lower quality advantage δ of the new product is enough to
prevent the set of consumers from shrinking. Similarly, a smaller quality diﬀerence in favor of the
old product is enough to drive out the new product immediately. Nevertheless, as long as l<∞, so
that communication has some limitation, there is expected disappointment in the population, which
causes negative messages to be sent and leads to a decline in the measure of consumers from round 1
to round 2. Our results from the benchmark generalize.23
Before turning to other extensions, we note that, interestingly, the one eﬀect that becomes stronger
and not weaker by making communication more precise is the non-monotonicity of the probability of
consuming with respect to the initial beliefs x0i. In contrast to the benchmark case, this derivative can
change sign several times already in round 2. As Figure 6 illustrates, with more precise communication,
even very optimistic agents might stop consuming a slightly superior new product immediately after
the ﬁrst round of learning. (In the Figure, c< 1
16, and l =4 , so that opinions are adjusted by multiples
of 1
16, according to (10).)
23As before, communication helps the disappointment to become smaller, so that these eﬀects will decline as learning
occurs over several rounds. Since communication is more precise, we expect the processes described in Proposition 2 to
converge faster.
205 Consumption experience as a signal
In this section, we relax Assumption 1 by allowing for the fact that consumption might not reveal fully
the quality of a product. We show that the ﬁnding of negative ”post decision surprise” of Harrison
and March (1984), which in our model results in negative messages sent, survives in this setting, but
expected disappointment decreases with the variance of the signal that consumption provides.
We now assume that if an agent decides to consume the new product, she receives a signal, which
is of at least the same quality as her prior x0i. In particular, we assume that x1i = θ + ε1i,w h e r e
ε1i ∼ U (−a,a),a n d0 ≤ a ≤ 1
2 is a known constant (the benchmark corresponds to a =0 ) .L e t
∆xi ≡ x1i−x0i. An agent’s posterior opinion, conditional on having consumed the good, is as follows:
oi(θ|x0i,x 1i)=

 
 
1
2(x1i + x0i − a + 1
2) if ∆xi > 1
2 − a
x1i if 1
2 − a>∆xi >a− 1
2
1
2(x1i + x0i + a − 1
2) if a − 1
2 > ∆xi

 
 
Clearly, oi(θ|x0i,x 1i) >o i(θ|x0i) (oi(θ|x0i,x 1i) <o i(θ|x0i))when ∆xi > 0 (∆xi < 0). For given ∆xi,
if the signal x1i is precise enough (so that a<1
2 −|∆xi|), it will override the ﬁrst signal in the agent’s
inference on θ.
The surprise of agent i is then given by
si =

 
 
1
2(∆xi − a + 1
2) if ∆xi > 1
2 − a
∆xi if 1
2 − a>∆xi >a− 1
2
1
2(∆xi + a − 1
2) if a − 1
2 > ∆xi

 
 
As before, if everyone buys the product, one can check that
E (si|θ)=0 . (12)
Because on average people hold correct beliefs, the average surprise is zero. How does expected surprise
change from (12) when only those with x0i >cconsume the new product? The following Proposition
provides the answer.
Proposition 5 On the domain a ∈
£
0, 1
2
¤
,δ∈
¡
−1
2, 1
2
¢
we have E(si|x0i >c ) < 0,
∂|E(si|x0i>c)|
∂δ < 0
and
∂|E(si|x0i>c)|
∂a < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The ﬁrst two statements simply generalize the properties derived in the benchmark case. There
is disappointment for all values of a, and the disappointment is reduced if the new product yields
a higher surplus δ so that more agents will consume it. The third result is more interesting: as a
increases for given δ, so that experience provides a less precise signal of the true quality, the expected
disappointment in the population declines. To see the intuition, recall that average disappointment
is caused by a lack of positive surprises from the agents with x0i below θ who did not consume the
21good.24 This eﬀect is reduced if some of the agents with x0i above θ can have positive surprises with
some probability. But the more precise the second signal, the higher this probability,25 making the
lack of positive surprises from the lower end of the distribution less salient and decreasing average
disappointment. Disappointment is thus smallest when a = 1
2 (both signals have the same quality).
When a =0 , as in the benchmark model, quality is perfectly revealed, and expected disappointment
reaches its maximum of 1
2(δ − 1
2).
6 Perfect communication with a threshold
In this section, we modify the rules governing communication in the model (Assumption 2). We
assume that experiences x1i can be communicated precisely, but communication occurs only if the
surprise of agent i was larger than a ﬁxed “communication threshold” ¯ s. Formally, we assume that
mij =
(
0 if − ¯ s ≤ si ≤ ¯ s
x1i otherwise
)
. (13)
This seems realistic: many of us would ﬁnd a surprising experience a more interesting topic for
conversation than an unsurprising one. Remembering past experiences might also be easier if the
experience was suﬃciently diﬀerent from what we expected.26
Compared to previous sections, now surprises do not aﬀect the content of the messages directly, only
the probability that they are sent. Furthermore, we no longer need to assume that the receiver knows
something about the initial expectation of the sender for social learning to be informative. Because the
experience itself is communicated, messages will always contain information. Finally, note that with
messages given by (13), learning is trivial when x1i = θ. To make the model interesting, we assume
that the signal provided by the consumption experience is only as good as the prior x0i. Thus, we will
consider the case of a = 1
2, in the notation of the previous section.
We show that our basic result that the expected message received is negative even if the new
product is better holds in this set-up as well. The reason, however, is quite diﬀerent from before.
Note that we now have two selection eﬀects. First, a subset of agents deﬁned by c is selected to
consume the good (selection in participation). Next, of the potential messages reporting about the
consumption experience, only a subset deﬁned by ¯ s is actually sent (selection in communication).
None of these distortions aﬀects the content of the message. Those who do send a message will reveal
their experience, x1i, w h i c hi sa nu n b i a s e ds i g n a lo fθ. Nevertheless, as we show below, the average
message will still be biased downwards. This is a consequence of the interaction of the two selection
eﬀects.
24Note that if a<δ , those who did not consume the good would have gotten a signal higher than x0i with probability
1, had they consumed it.
25For example, when δ<0, the only way anyone can have a positive surprise with some probability is if a is large
enough to exceed |δ|.
26A more complicated formulation would make the precision of the signal received from a network partner an increasing
function of |si|. This might be justiﬁed for example if people talk about bigger surprises in greater length, making it
possible to transmit more precise information.
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Figure 7: Perfect communication with a threshold
When a = 1
2, results in the previous section imply that si = 1
2 (x1i − x0i). Agents will be positively
(negatively) surprised if their experience is higher (lower) than their prior. The two selection eﬀects
are illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the joint distribution of the signals x1i and x0i. The lines with
positive slopes are “iso-surprise” lines (pairs (x0i,x 1i) which yield a given value of si),w i t hi n c r e a s i n g
surprise as we move up and left on the graph. The vertical line at x0i = c shows the selection in
participation: only agents with noises to the right of this line will send messages. The upward sloping
lines x1i = x0i +2 ¯ s and x1i = x0i − 2¯ s show the selection in communication: above the upper line,
the positive surprise of the agents will be high enou g ht om a k et h e mt a l k ,w h i l eb e l o wt h el o w e rl i n e ,
agents will be disappointed enough to talk. Hence, messages will only be sent by agents with noises
in areas A and B, with messages from area A typically being the high messages, while messages from
area B typically being the low messages. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, for any c and ¯ s, more agents
are removed from area A than from area B. When ¯ s>0, this implies that on average lower messages
are sent, i.e. the expected message sent is below θ.
Note that since the signals x1i and x0i are independent, if ¯ s =0 , any subset of agents send
messages that are accurate on average, so that selection in participation is irrelevant. Although with
¯ s =0there would still be more disappointed agents, with perfect communication disappointment per
se does not matter, as messages are determined by experience (i.e. whether an agent was lucky (high
x1i) or unlucky (low x1i)). When the threshold is positive, ¯ s>0,x 0i and x1i jointly determine the
probability of sending a message. This makes selection in participation, which is based on x0i, relevant
for the expected content of the message, which is based on x1i.
Similarly, with no selection in participation, selection in communication does not matter. If δ ≥ 1
2,
the distribution of messages will be symmetric around θ for any value of ¯ s, so that selection in
communication has no eﬀect. Hence, it is the interaction of the two selection eﬀects which causes
messages to be negatively biased.
These arguments are developed more formally in the following proposition.
23Proposition 6 For any −1
2 <δ<1
2 and 0 < ¯ s<1
2,E(mij|θ) <θ .
Proof. Write the expected message as
E (mij|θ)=E (x1i|θ,mij 6=0 )=E (x1i|si > ¯ s)Pr(si > ¯ s)+E (x1i|si < −¯ s)Pr(si < −¯ s)
Consider ﬁrst the case where each agent i consumes the good, so that δ ≥ 1
2:
E (x1i|si > ¯ s)Pr(si > ¯ s)=
θ+1
2−2¯ s R
θ−1
2
θ+1
2 R
2¯ s+x0i
x1idx1idx0i =
1
12
(4¯ s +1 )( 2¯ s − 1)
2
E (x1i|si < ¯ s)Pr(si < ¯ s)=
θ+1
2 R
θ+2¯ s−1
2
x0i−2¯ s R
θ−1
2
x1idx1idx0i = −
1
12
(4¯ s +1 )( 2¯ s − 1)
2
Hence, in this case E (mij|θ)=θ.
We will now show that as we increase c, E (x1i|θ,mij 6=0 )falls monotonically, so that E (mij|θ) is
always below θ.From our ﬁgure, it is clear that as we increase c, the marginal change of E (x1i|θ,mij 6=0 )
is
∂E(x1i|θ,mij 6=0 )
∂c
= −χθ−1
2<c<θ+1
2−2¯ s
θ+1
2 R
c+2¯ s
x1idx1i + χθ+2¯ s−1
2<c<θ+1
2
c−2¯ s R
θ−1
2
x1idx1i
where χ is the indicator function, and the ﬁrst term is the change in the expectation due to the
change in area A and the second term is the eﬀect of the change in area B. Note that the ﬁrst term
is always negative, while the second term is always positive in the relevant interval. We can rewrite
this expression as follows:
∂E(x1i|θ,mij 6=0 )
∂c
= −χθ−1
2<c<θ+1
2−2¯ s
1
2
µ
1
4
− (2¯ s − δ)
2
¶
+ χθ+2¯ s−1
2<c<θ+1
2
1
2
µ
(−δ − 2¯ s)
2 −
1
4
¶
= −χθ−1
2<c<θ+2¯ s−1
2
1
2
µ
1
4
− (2¯ s − δ)
2
¶
+ χθ+2¯ s−1
2<c<θ+1
2−2¯ s
1
2
µ
−8δ¯ s −
1
4
¶
+χθ+1
2−2¯ s<c<θ+1
2
1
2
µ
(−δ − 2¯ s)
2 −
1
4
¶
One can check that all three terms are negative for any decision cut-oﬀ c ∈ [θ − 1
2,θ+ 1
2] and any
conversation cut-oﬀ, 0 < ¯ s<1
2, so that E (mij|θ) ≤ θ for all δ.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studied a simple model of social learning which incorporates two realistic features: sub-
jective communication and self-selection of social contacts. Self-selection implies that consumers of
a product with unknown quality will be disappointed on average. Subjective communication means
that messages sent by these disappointed consumers will tend to be negative. We analyzed how these
negative messages aﬀected other agents’ opinions and likelihood of consuming a new product.
24In a benchmark model with close contacts, limited subjective communication and fully revealing
experience, we showed that average disappointment declines over time, but the overwhelmingly nega-
tive messages lead to a decrease in the measure of consumers. Thus, subjective communication helps
eﬃciency by driving out inferior new products. Indeed, if the quality advantage of the old product
is large, the limited amount of information transmitted here is enough to drive out the new product
immediately after the ﬁrst round. However, learning hurts eﬃciency by causing some agents to stop
consuming a superior new product. Consumption of a new product that is only slightly better than
the old one can cease almost completely.
In an extension with neighbors instead of close contacts, we showed that larger neighborhoods
imply that a larger measure of consumers choose the new product, regardless of its quality. We
described four eﬀects of having neighbors (experienced-neighbor, inexperienced-neighbor, misleading-
neighbor,a n dlearning-from-neighbors), which together suggest that more ”diverse” neighborhoods
are more favorable to the diﬀusion of a superior new product, but also that these same neighborhoods
are slower in driving out inferior new products.
We showed that the results of the benchmark case are robust to allowing more accurate com-
munication, with an interesting pattern of non-monotonic consumption likelihood emerging in this
case. We also showed that the basic phenomenon driving our results, expected disappointment and
negative messages, remains if we allow for the consumption experience to provide an imperfect signal
of the true quality, or if subjective communication is modeled as perfect communication subject to a
surprise-threshold.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
To simplify the notation, denote W∗ =[ x0j − ω,x0j], W∗∗ =[ x0j,x 0j + ω] and W = W∗ ∪ W∗∗. For
mij 6=0 , w ec a nt h e nw r i t e
o2
j (θ|x0j,m ij)=o2
j (θ|x0j,sign(si),x 0i ∈ W)
= o2
j (θ|x0j,sign(si),x 0i ∈ W∗∗)Pr(x0i ∈ W∗∗|x0j,sign(si))
+o2
j (θ|x0j,sign(si),x 0i ∈ W∗)Pr(x0i ∈ W∗|x0j,sign(si)). (14)
(i) If x0j >c+ ω, then mij 6=0necessarily. In this case,
Pr(x0i ∈ W∗∗|x0j,sign(si)) = Pr(x0i ∈ W∗|x0j,sign(si)) =
1
2
. (15)
25Given a positive message mij =1 , we may use o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗∗,s i > 0,x 0j,x 0i)=
x0i+x0j+1
2
2 to ﬁnd
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗∗,s i > 0,x 0j)=
x0j+ω R
x0j
x0i + x0j + 1
2
2
Pr(x0i)dx0i =
1
ω
x0j+ω R
x0j
x0i + x0j + 1
2
2
dx0i
=
1
4
+ x0j +
ω
4
, (16)
and o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗,s i > 0,x 0j,x 0i)=x0i + 1
4 to ﬁnd
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗,s i > 0,x 0j)=
1
ω
x0j R
x0j−ω
x0i +
1
4
dx0i =
1
4
+ x0j −
1
2
ω. (17)
Substituting (15-17) into (14), we get
o2
j (θ|x0j,m ij =1 )=
1
2
µ
1
4
+ x0j +
1
4
ω
¶
+
1
2
µ
1
4
+ x0j −
1
2
ω
¶
= x0j −
1
8
ω +
1
4
.
By the same logic, we ﬁnd
o2
j (θ|x0j,m ij = −1) =
1
2
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗∗,s i < 0,x 0j)+
1
2
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗,s i < 0,x 0j)
=
1
2
"
1
ω
x0j+ω R
x0j
x0i −
1
4
dx0i +
1
ω
x0j R
x0j−ω
x0i + x0j − 1
2
2
dx0i
#
= x0 +
1
8
ω −
1
4
(ii) If c<x 0j <c+ ω, then for mij 6=0 ,
Pr(x0i ∈ W∗∗|x0j,sign(si)) =
ω
ω + x0j − c
(18)
Pr(x0i ∈ W∗|x0j,sign(si)) =
x0j − c
ω + x0j − c
(19)
Given a positive message mij =1 , we again ﬁnd o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗∗,s i > 0,x 0j,x 0i)=
x0i+x0j+1
2
2 and
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗∗,s i > 0,x 0j)=
1
4
+ x0j +
1
4
ω. (20)
We also have o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗,s i > 0,x 0j,x 0i)=x0i + 1
4, which now implies
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗,s i > 0,x 0j)=
1
x0j − c
x0j R
c
x0i +
1
4
dx0i =
1
4
+
x0j + c
2
. (21)
Substituting (18-21) into (14) gives:
o2
j (θ|x0j,m ij =1 )=
ω
ω + x0j − c
µ
1
4
+ x0j +
1
4
ω
¶
+
x0j − c
ω + x0j − c
µ
1
4
+
x0j + c
2
¶
.
26For bad news (mij = −1),o 2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗∗,s i < 0,x 0j,x 0i)=x0i − 1
4,and
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗∗,s i < 0,x 0j)=x0j +
ω
2
−
1
4
.
Moreover, o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗,s i < 0,x 0j,x 0i)=
x0i+x0j−1
2
2 ,a n d
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W∗,s i < 0,x 0j,x 0i)=
1
4
c +
3
4
x0 −
1
4
.
Therefore, from (14),
o2
j (θ|x0j,m ij = −1) =
ω
ω + x0j − c
µ
x0j +
ω
2
−
1
4
¶
+
x0j − c
ω + x0j − c
µ
1
4
c +
3
4
x0 −
1
4
¶
.
For mij =0 ,x 0i must be in W0 =[ x0j − ω,c]. We ﬁnd o2
j (x0i|x0i ∈ W0,x 0j)=
x0j−ω−c
2 ,a n d
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W0,x 0j,x 0i)=
x0j+x0i
2 , which implies that
o2
j (θ|x0j,m ij =0 )=o2
j
¡
θ|x0i ∈ W0,x 0j
¢
=
1
4
(3x0j − ω + c).
(iii) If c − ω<x 0j <cthen non-zero messages can only come from W00 =[ c,x0j + ω]. Using
o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W00,s i > 0,x 0j,x 0i)=
x0i+x0j+1
2
2 ,w eg e t
o2
j (θ|x0j,m ij =1 )=
1
x0j + ω − c
x0j+ω R
c
x0i + x0j + 1
2
2
dx0i =
1
4
(c + ω +3 x0j +1 ) .
For bad news, o2
j (θ|x0i ∈ W00,s i < 0,x 0j,x 0i)=x0i − 1
4, and
o2
j (θ|x0j,m ij = −1) =
1
2
c +
1
2
x0 +
1
2
ω −
1
4
.
Finally, mij =0implies x0i ∈ W0 =[ x0j − ω,c] as in case (ii), therefore we again get
o2
j (θ|x0j,m ij =0 )=
1
4
(3x0j − ω + c).
27A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider ﬁrst the case of δ>1
4. The following table describes the relevant ranges of x0j, the messages
received, and the resulting decisions.
Range Restriction Possible messages Tries New?
1. x0j <c− ω {0} No
2. c − ω<x 0j <c+ ω
3
(
1 with prob.
x0j+ω−c
2ω
0 otherwise
)
Only if mij =1
3. c + ω
3 <x 0j <c+ ω
(
0 with prob.
c−(x0j−ω)
2ω
−1 otherwise
)
Yes
4. c + ω<x 0j <θ− ω {1} Yes
5. θ − ω<x 0j <θ+ ω
(
1 with prob.
θ−(x0j−ω)
2ω
−1 otherwise
)
Yes
6. θ + ω<x 0j {−1} Yes
The experienced-neighbor and the inexperienced-neighbor eﬀects explained in the text appear in range
2. The measure of agents consuming in round 2 can be computed as
Pr
¡
o2
j(mij) >c
¢
=
Z c+ω
3
c−ω
x0j − (c − ω)
2ω
dx0j +
1
2
+ δ −
ω
3
=
1
2
+ δ +
1
9
ω,
which is higher than the 1
2+δ w es a wi ns e c t i o n2 .T h ed i ﬀerence is larger, the larger the neighborhood.
When 1
4 − ω
8 <δ<1
4, the above table still applies, but the interpretation changes slightly: we now
also have a learning-from-neighbors eﬀect, for x0j between θ and c + 1
4 in range 5.
When 1
4 − 9
8ω<δ<1
4 − ω
8, the above table applies, except that within range 5, for θ − ω<
x0j <c+ 1
4 − ω
8, the new product will only be consumed if mij =1 . We have the experienced-neighbor
and the inexperienced-neighbor eﬀects in range 2, misleading-neighbors eﬀects in range 5, and the
learning-from-neighbors eﬀect in range 6. We ﬁnd the measure of consumers as
Pr
¡
o2
j(mij) >c
¢
=
Z c+ω
3
c−ω
x0j + ω − c
2ω
dx0j +
Z θ−ω
c+ω
3
dx0j +
Z c+1
4−ω
8
θ−ω
θ − (x0j − ω)
2ω
dx0j +
Z θ+1
2
c+1
4−ω
8
dx0j
=2 δ +
1
4
+(
1
8
+
1
9
)ω − (
1
4
−
9ω
8
− δ)2 1
4ω
.
One can check that this is larger than the 2δ + 1
4 of the benchmark case, so that the positive neigh-
borhood eﬀects dominate.
When ω<δ<1
4 − 9
8ω, agents in range 5 will only consume the new product if they get a positive
message, and within range 6, agents with θ + ω<x 0j <c+ 1
4 − ω
8 will never consume it. We
observe the experienced-neighbor eﬀect (range 2), the misleading-neighbor eﬀect (range 5), and the
learning-from-neighbors eﬀect (range 6). We ﬁnd the measure of consumers to be
28Pr
¡
o2
j(mij) >c
¢
=
Z c+ω
3
c−ω
x0j + ω − c
2ω
dx0j +
Z θ−ω
c+ω
3
dx0j +
Z θ+ω
θ−ω
θ − (x0j − ω)
2ω
dx0j +
Z θ+1
2
c+1
4−ω
8
dx0j
=(
1
8
+
1
9
)ω +2 δ +
1
4
which is higher than the 2δ + 1
4 of the benchmark case.
When 0 <δ<ω ,we ﬁnd
Range Restriction Message Tries?
1. x0j <c− ω {0} No
2. c − ω<x 0j <θ− ω
(
1 with prob.
x0j+ω−c
2ω
0 otherwise
)
Only if mij =1
3. θ − ω<x 0j <c+ ω
3

 
 
−1 with prob.
x0j+ω−θ
2ω
1 with prob. θ−c
2ω
0 otherwise

 
 
Only if mij =1
4. c + ω
3 <x 0j <c+ ω

 
 
−1 with prob.
x0j+ω−θ
2ω
1 with prob. θ−c
2ω
0 otherwise

 
 
Only if mij =1
or mij =0
5. c + ω<x 0j <θ+ ω
(
1 with prob.
θ−(x0j−ω)
2ω
−1 otherwise
)
Only if mij =1
6. θ + ω<x 0j <c+ 1
4 − ω
8 {−1} No
7. c + 1
4 − ω
8 <x 0j {−1} Yes
We see the experienced-neighbor eﬀect in range 2 and 3, the inexperienced-neighbor eﬀect in range 4
(for x0j ∈ [θ,c+ω]), the misleading-neighbor eﬀect in range 5, and the learning-from-neighbors eﬀect
in range 7. The measure of consumers is given by
Pr
¡
o2
j(mij) >c
¢
=
Z θ−ω
c−ω
x0j + ω − c
2ω
dx0j +
Z c+ω
3
θ−ω
θ − c
2ω
dx0j +
Z c+ω
c+ω
3
ω − x0j + θ
2ω
dx0j
+
Z θ+ω
c+ω
θ − (x0j − ω)
2ω
dx0j +
Z θ+1
2
c+1
4−ω
8
dx0j
=
·
ω − c
2ω
(θ − c)+
(θ − c)(c + θ − 2ω)
4ω
¸
+
(c − θ + 4
3ω)(θ − c)
2ω
+
·
θ + ω
3
− (2c +
4
3
ω)
1
12
¸
+
·
θ + ω
2ω
(θ − c) −
(θ − c)(θ + c +2 ω)
4ω
¸
+ θ +
1
2
− (c +
1
4
−
ω
8
)
Finally, consider the case of an inferior new product (δ<0). The various possibilities are given in
29the following table:
Range Restriction Possible messages Tries New?
1. x0j <c− ω {0} No
2. c − ω<x 0j <c+ ω
3 {0,−1} No
3. c + ω
3 <x 0j <c+ ω
(
0 with prob.
c−(x0j−ω)
2ω
−1 otherwise
)
Only if mij =0
4. c + ω<x 0j <c+ 1
4 − ω
8 {−1} No
5. c + 1
4 − ω
8 <x 0j {−1} Yes
If −1
4 − ω
8 >δ ,only the inexperienced-neighbor eﬀect is at work (in range 3), and we ﬁnd the measure
of consumers to be
Pr(o2
j >c )=
Z c+ω
c+ω
3
c − (x0j − ω)
2ω
dx0j =
1
9
ω.
If −1
4 − ω
8 <δ ,b o t ht h einexperienced-neighbor eﬀect and the learning-from-neighbor eﬀe c t( r a n g e5 )
operates, and we ﬁnd
Pr(o2
j >c )=
1
9
ω +
Z θ+1
2
c+1
4−ω
8
dx0j =
µ
1
9
+
1
8
¶
ω + δ +
1
4
,
which is also larger than in section 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
We ﬁrst compute the density function of ∆xi, g(∆xi|x0i >c ):
if 2a − 1
2 <δ ,
g(∆xi|x0i >c )=

     
     
a−∆xi+δ
a(1+2δ) if δ + a>∆xi >δ− a
2
2δ+1 if δ − a>∆xi >a− 1
2
a+∆xi+1
2
a(1+2δ) if a − 1
2 > ∆xi > −a − 1
2
0 otherwise

     
     
if 2a − 1
2 >δ ,
g(∆xi|x0i >c )=

     
     
a−∆xi+δ
a(1+2δ) if δ + a>∆xi >a− 1
2
1
2a if a − 1
2 > ∆xi >δ− a
a+∆xi+1
2
a(1+2δ) if δ − a>∆xi > −a − 1
2
0 otherwise

     
     
Expected surprise can now be computed as follows:
30if 0 ≤ a<1
4 −
|δ|
2 ,
E(si|x0i >c , θ )=
a+δ Z
δ−a
∆xi
a − ∆xi + δ
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi +
δ−a Z
a−1
2
∆xi
2
1+2 δ
d∆xi +
a−1
2 Z
−a−1
2
1
2
µ
∆xi + a −
1
2
¶
a + ∆xi + 1
2
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi
=
1
3
a2
δ + 1
2
+
1
2
µ
δ −
1
2
¶
if 1
4 − δ
2 ≤ a<1
4 + δ
2 (implying that δ>0),
E(si|x0i >c , θ )=
a+δ Z
1
2−a
1
2
µ
∆xi − a +
1
2
¶
a − ∆xi + δ
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi +
1
2−a Z
δ−a
∆xi
a − ∆xi + δ
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi +
δ−a Z
a−1
2
∆xi
2
1+2 δ
d∆xi
+
a−1
2 Z
−a−1
2
1
2
µ
∆xi + a −
1
2
¶
a + ∆xi + 1
2
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi
= −
1
24
(2δ − 1)((1
2 − δ +3 a)2 − 3a(4 − a))
a(2δ +1 )
if 1
4 + δ
2 ≤ a<1
4 − δ
2 (implying that δ<0),
E(si|x0i >c , θ )=
a+δ Z
a−1
2
∆xi
a − ∆xi + δ
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi +
a−1
2 Z
δ−a
1
2
µ
∆xi + a −
1
2
¶
1
2a
d∆xi
+
δ−a Z
−a−1
2
1
2
µ
∆xi + a −
1
2
¶
a + ∆xi + 1
2
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi
= etc.
if 1
4 +
|δ|
2 ≤ a,
E(si|x0i >c , θ )=
a+δ Z
1
2−a
1
2
µ
∆xi − a +
1
2
¶
a − ∆xi + δ
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi +
1
2−a Z
a−1
2
∆xi
a − ∆xi + δ
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi
+
a−1
2 Z
δ−a
1
2
µ
∆xi + a −
1
2
¶
1
2a
d∆xi +
δ−a Z
−a−1
2
1
2
µ
∆xi + a −
1
2
¶
a + ∆xi + 1
2
a(1 + 2δ)
d∆xi
= −
1
24
"
16
¡
a − 1
2
¢3
a(2δ +1 )
−
3
a
µ
δ −
1
2
¶#
31The results in the Proposition follow.
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